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Abstract
Purpose: To evaluate the implementation of a magnetic resonance (MR)-only workflow (ie,
implementing MR simulation as the primary planning modality) using failure mode and effects
analysis (FMEA) in comparison with a conventional multimodality (MR simulation in conjunction
with computed tomography simulation) workflow for pelvis external beam planning.
Methods and Materials: To perform the FMEA, a multidisciplinary 9-member team was assembled
and developed process maps, identified potential failure modes (FMs), and assigned numerical values
to the severity (S), frequency of occurrence (O), and detectability (D) of those FMs. Risk priority
numbers (RPNs) were calculated via the product of S, O, and D as a metric for evaluating relative
patient risk. An alternative 3-digit composite number (SOD) was computed to emphasize high-severity
FMs. Fault tree analysis identified the causality chain leading to the highest-severity FM.
Results: Seven processes were identified, 3 of which were shared between workflows. Image fusion
and target delineation subprocesses using the conventional workflow added 9 and 10 FMs,
respectively, with 6 RPNs >100. By contrast, synthetic computed tomography generation introduced
3 major subprocesses and propagated 46 unique FMs, 15 with RPNs >100. For the conventional
workflow, the largest RPN scores were introduced by image fusion (RPN range, 120-192). For the
MR-only workflow, the highest RPN scores were from inaccuracies in target delineation resulting
from misinterpretation of MR images (RPN Z 240) and insufficient management of patient- and
system-level distortions (RPN Z 210 and 168, respectively). Underestimation (RPN Z 140) or
overestimation (RPN Z 192) of bone volume produced higher RPN scores. The highest SODs for
both workflows were related to changes in target location because of internal anatomy changes
(conventional Z 961, MR-only Z 822).
Conclusions: FMEA identified areas for mitigating risk in MR-only pelvis RTP, and SODs identified
high-severity process modes. Efforts to develop a quality management program to mitigate high FMs
are underway.
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Introduction
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) provides excellent
soft tissue contrast that is substantially superior to that
provided by computed tomography (CT), which has led to
the incorporation of MRI into the radiation therapy
treatment planning (RTP) process. Traditionally this has
taken the form of using MRI as an adjunct to the CT
simulation image (CT-SIM) for delineation of target or
organ-at-risk volumes.1 In this conventional workflow,
MR images are first rigidly registered to the CT-SIM,
target volumes are contoured on the MR images, and
the contours are then mapped to the CT-SIM for use
during treatment plan optimization and evaluation. Aside
from increasing the clinical workload, the main limitation
of this method is the systematic uncertainty, reported to be
up to 4 mm in the pelvis,2,3 added by the registration
process. Importantly, this systematic uncertainty persists
throughout treatment, cannot be mitigated with image
guided radiation therapy, and could therefore lead to
geometric misses and compromised tumor control.
Thus, MR-only treatment planning has emerged as an
attractive alternative to the traditional combined MR/CT
workflow. However, before MR-only treatment planning
in the pelvis can undergo widespread implementation,
several important practical issues must be addressed,
including the mitigation of geometric distortions and the
development of a method for generating the electron
density information necessary for accurate dose calcula-
tion. At this time, at least 2 methods have met European
regulatory approval (been CE (Conformité Européene)
marked) for use in the pelvis (Spectronic MriPlanner4 and
Philips MR-CAT) with one also receiving Food and Drug
Administration approval5 (Philips MR-CAT).
As these major obstacles are addressed and MR-only
treatment planning moves closer to clinical implementa-
tion, it is imperative that the MR-only workflow be
comprehensively evaluated to identify potential high-risk
areas that may require additional safeguards and quality
assurance procedures to be put in place. Additionally, a
thorough evaluation of the workflow is necessary to
educate all involved members of the radiation therapy
team. This work aims to address this unmet need by
examining the MR-only workflow using failure mode and
effects analysis (FMEA). FMEA is widely used in in-
dustrial settings for systematically assessing risk by iden-
tifying possible failure modes (FMs) that can occur
throughout the entire workflow and prioritizing actions to
reduce risk based on 3 major aspects: (1) the severity of
the effects from FMs, (2) their frequency of occurrence,
and (3) the detectability of their occurrence.6 FMEA is
often applied to either validate the design of a process or to
monitor and improve existing procedures as part of a
continual improvement process.7 Recently, several groups
have applied this methodology within radiation oncology
for a variety of applications to develop more robust quality
management programs.8e10 In this study, we applied
design FMEA to an MR-only simulation workflow that is
proposed for use in our clinic and then compared it with
the conventional multimodality workflow (MR simulation
[MR-SIM] used as an adjunct to CT-SIM) for pelvis
external beam RTP. This comparison was performed to
highlight sources of error that may arise that are unique to
the MR-only treatment planning environment and will
require careful attention to mitigate risk in a future
implementation as well as to identify areas of common-
ality where we can carry over existing processes. As we
aim to bring this emerging technology into widespread
clinical practice, a need exists to understand potential
problems and to mitigate any foreseeable errors that may
arise during the implementation of this methodology.
Methods and Materials
FMEA
The first step in FMEA involves identifying key pro-
cesses within the overall workflow. For each process, all
possible methods that might lead to the failure of any task
within that process (ie, FMs) are identified. Each FM is
then given 3 scores based (1) on the most severe effect
resulting from the failed task (S for severity), (2) the
frequency with which the FM would occur (O for
occurrence), and (3) the likelihood that the failure would
be detected given the currently used quality control/
quality assurance framework (D for detectability). These
assigned S, O, and D scores are then used to calculate a
risk metric that is used to assign a priority level for
addressing the FMs.
A 9-member multidisciplinary team consisting of 3
medical physicists, 2 radiation oncologists, 2 radiation
therapists, and 2 MR technologists performed FMEA for
our institutional MR-only workflow and our current
multimodality pelvis MR-SIM process. The medical
physics group began by developing the high-level process
maps for each workflow that are shown in Figure 1,
wherein main processes were identified for each work-
flow. For each main process, a list of necessary tasks was
developed and listed as subprocesses under one of these
main categories. Team members were assigned to the
most appropriate process for their discipline (eg, thera-
pists for the immobilization/positioning process, MR
technologists for the MRI process). A list was compiled to
include FMs for each subprocess as well as any new
subprocess previously overlooked. Hence, all process
maps were reviewed by members of the team, and addi-
tional subprocesses were identified. Each FM was dis-
cussed with the other team members. For implementation,
a list of failure pathways leading to each FM was then
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generated and assigned a score with respect to S, O, and D
by the medical physicist group.
For this study, to reduce subjectivity in scoring, we
used the ranking system defined by the American Asso-
ciation of Physicists in Medicine Task Group 100.11 The
system uses a 10-point scale for each category, with 1
defined as the least severe, least common, and most easily
detected for the S, O, and D categories, respectively.
Typically the risk metric used for determining the relative
risk for each FM is the risk priority number (RPN), which
is the product of the S, O, and D values that were scored
for each FM.12 Although the RPN number has become a
standard metric for evaluating the relative risk of FMs,
there exist some limitations with using this simple prod-
uct.13 For example, only 120 unique RPN scores exist for
1000 different combinations of S, O, and D values, and
these unique RPN values are not evenly distributed on a
continuum from 1 (RPN Z S*O*D Z 1*1*1) to 1000
(RPN Z S*O*D Z 10*10*10), with the result that 90%
of possible S, O, and D combinations result in RPN scores
less than 405. Because no priority is given to any indi-
vidual category, it is possible to have an RPN score for an
FM with very severe effects (eg, S, O, DZ 9, 3, 4) that is
the same as that for an FM that has low severity but
moderately higher occurrence and detectability scores (eg,
S, O, DZ 3, 6, 6). Thus we have employed an alternative
metric that preferentially weights the severity of the FM:
the SOD score.
SOD was first introduced as an alternative to RPN in
the Automotive Industry Action Group’s FMEA
manual.14 The SOD is a simple composite of the 3 scores,
in which the severity of the failure is the first digit, fol-
lowed in order by rate of occurrence and detectability (eg,
scores of 8, 3, and 4 for S, O, and D, respectively, give an
SOD value of 834). The purpose of using both RPN and
SOD values is that they provide complementary infor-
mation. RPN values provided a surrogate for relative
patient risk, and SOD values were used for prioritizing the
high-severity FMs within risk categories for the MR-only
and combined MR/CT workflows.
Fault tree analysis
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is part of the process of
identifying elements in a chain of causation that could
lead to the various FMs. FTA is used to identify the
possible negative outcomes that could occur given an
initiating event and to represent the failure pathway via a
block diagram. A detailed FTA was performed for the FM
that was found to yield the highest severity scores.
Radiation treatment planning workflows
Figure 1 illustrates high-level process mapping, high-
lighting the 3 overall shared processes (in blue) that are
identical between workflows. For the conventional mul-
timodality workflow used in our clinic, the patient un-
dergoes a CT-SIM using a Brilliance Big Bore (Philips
Healthcare, Cleveland, OH) CT scanner. This is followed
by an MR-SIM imaging session in our dedicated 1.0T
Panorama High Field Open (Philips Medical Systems,
Best, Netherlands) MR simulator using a flat tabletop and
the same immobilization devices as used in CT-SIM.
Both CT and MR images are then imported into the
Eclipse treatment planning system (Varian Medical Sys-
tems, Palo Alto, CA) where the MR images are rigidly
registered to the CT, a process that introduces several
Figure 1 High-level process map showing the main processes for both the magnetic resonance (MR)eonly and conventional mul-
timodality workflows as well as select subprocesses unique to each workflow. Green indicates those processes unique to the multi-
modality workflow, red indicates those processes unique to the MR-only workflow, and blue indicates those processes that are identical
between the 2. Abbreviations: CT Z computed tomography; DICOM Z Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine; DRR Z
digitally reconstructed radiograph; IV Z intravenous; MRI Z magnetic resonance imaging; RT Z radiation therapy; TPS Z trans-
action processing system.
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unique subprocesses and FMs. The physician contours the
target on the MR images, contours are mapped to the CT-
SIM, and a treatment plan is generated. In the conven-
tional multimodality workflow, the CT data set is used to
determine the electron density values required for dose
calculation and to generate digitally reconstructed radio-
graphs (DRRs), which are used for patient localization at
the time of treatment for image guided radiation therapy.
For our pelvis population, we typically treat using in-
tensity modulated arc therapy or 9 static-field intensity
modulated radiation therapy treatments.
The MR-only workflow begins with the patient un-
dergoing an MR-SIM on the previously mentioned Phi-
lips 1.0T Panorama. This is followed by generation of a
synthetic CT (synCT) from the acquired MR images.
SynCTs are used for dose calculation and DRR genera-
tion in an MR-only setting and are typically generated via
atlas-based15,16 or intensity-based17e19 approaches. The
approach used in this study was developed at our insti-
tution and involves a voxel-based weighted summation
method that has been described in detail in a previous
publication.19 Briefly, our synCT workflow requires
manual segmentation of pelvic bones followed by auto-
mated segmentation of air, soft tissue, fat, and fluid using
k-means clustering and morphologic operations. Each
synCT voxel value is then calculated as a summation of
intensity values from the acquired MR images that have
been weighted by sequence- and class-specific factors.
The synCTs and MR images are then imported into the
Eclipse treatment planning system, where the MR images
are used for target and organ-at-risk definition, and the
synCTs are used for dose calculation and DRR
generation.
Results
The process map developed by the team is shown in
Figure 1. Seven main processes were identified for the
multimodality workflow and 6 for the MR-only workflow.
The main processes captured the key steps in our simu-
lation and treatment planning workflows. Included sub-
processes were broad enough to include several FMs and
provided a good overview of the focus of each main
category. Processes 1 to 5 for the multimodality workflow
and 1 to 4 for the MR-only workflow mainly focused on
departmental logistics, MRI procedure and simulation,
and data transfer domains. These were largely the same
between the 2 workflows, even with respect to sub-
processes and FMs. Processes 3 and 4 (MRI and CT
simulation) for the multimodality workflow were com-
bined into a single MR-SIM process (process 3) in the
MR-only workflow. However, the subprocesses and FMs
in the MR-only process were the same as in the 2 MRI
and CT simulation processes in the multimodality work-
flow. The 3 main processes that the 2 workflows shared
were ordering of simulation procedures, immobilization
and positioning of the patient at time of simulation, and
transfer of data to the treatment planning system. For
these processes, the risk-mitigation strategies used for our
current multimodality workflow (eg, checklists, staff
training procedures, physical barriers preventing unqual-
ified personnel from entering certain areas) can be used
without modification for our proposed MR-only work-
flow. In all, these consisted of 24 subprocesses and 125
FMs.
Although Figure 1 shows significant overlap between
the MR-only and combined MR/CT treatment planning
workflows, several key areas were identified as unique to
MR-only planning. For example, geometric distortions,
which can be categorized as either machine specific or
patient specific, may have a significant impact on the
electron density map in an MR-only planning environ-
ment. The magnitude of machine-specific distortions can
be characterized in phantoms and then accounted for in
postprocessing,20,21 with the overall behavior increasing
in magnitude as the distance away from magnetic iso-
center increases,20 which is relevant for the large fields of
view required in pelvis radiation therapy. Patient-specific
distortions, on the other hand, depend on field strength
and can be reduced to within acceptable tolerances for
many body sites using appropriate MR sequences,
although these can be nonnegligible near tissue/air in-
terfaces.22 The extra processes required to generate a
synCT also introduce additional FMs in an MR-only
setting.
Process 6 was entirely different between workflows.
For the MR-only workflow, process 6 comprised synCT
generation, whereas for the multimodality workflow,
process 6 focused on MR-to-CT fusion. The addition
and use of a synCT introduced 3 additional subprocesses
and propagated 46 FMs (15 with FMs >100) unique to
the MR-only workflow. Table 1 best summarizes the
RPN and SOD results that were unique to the synCT
generation process, 8 of which had RPNs >100. The use
of synCT also introduces additional unique FMs based
on the interpretation of images, impact of segmentation
and density assignments on dose calculation, and bone
segmentation affecting DRR accuracy. In the conven-
tional workflow (MR/CT combined), the image fusion
and target delineation subprocesses added 19 total FMs
(6 being >100). One of the most significant FMs was
inaccurate localization of the tumor volume, which could
have several causes. FTA for this particular FM was
performed to identify all events that fall along the causal
chain that ultimately lead to the inaccurate localization.
Four failure pathways were identified with a total of 14
branches, where each pathway consisted of one or more
technical failures along with a failure in supervision,
often caused by inadequate training of the person over-
seeing the process. The FTA diagram is displayed in
Figure 2. Treatment planning was the seventh process
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Table 1 Unique synCT generation RPN and SOD scores before and after suggested modifications
Failure mode Failure pathway Before mitigation Suggested Change After mitigation
S O D RPN SOD S O D RPN SOD
1. Bone segmentation
Incorrect bone classification Bone/air indistinguishable in MR images 4 9 1 36 491 Consult with radiologists; apply consensus
guidelines; attend education programs
through national meetings (eg, RSNA)
4 9 1 36 491
Nonbone material classified as bone 5 8 1 40 581 5 4 1 20 541
Bone volume underestimated 4 7 4 112 474 4 4 3 48 443
Bone volume overestimated 4 8 4 128 484 4 5 3 60 453
Uncertainty from interobserver differences in
manual bone segmentation
4 5 3 60 453 4 4 3 48 443
2. Tissue classification/density assignments
SynCT not representative
of average anatomy
Long scan time leads to changes in internal
anatomy (bladder/rectal filling)
4 7 1 28 471 Minimize number of acquired sequences;
minimize acquisition time for each sequence
3 7 1 21 371
Varied physiologic states for different data sets
needed for synCT
4 7 1 28 471 3 7 1 21 371
Changed target location because of state 6 5 2 60 652 4 5 2 40 452
Patient-specific distortion corrections for air/
tissue may be inaccurate
4 4 5 80 445 3 4 5 60 345
Tissue misclassification/
inaccurate HU assignment
Inaccurate autosegmentation 4 6 3 72 463 Standardize sequences; increase the number
of patients to ensure a representative group
of patients in the training set
3 4 3 36 343
Patient not well represented by population-
based values
4 3 9 108 439 4 1 9 36 419
Population-based values derived from a
nonrepresentative set of patients
4 1 9 36 419 2 1 9 18 219
Not enough patients used to determine
population-based values
4 1 9 36 419 2 1 9 18 219
Inaccurate segmentation Image nonuniformity affecting automated
intensity-based segmentation approaches
4 5 5 100 455 Check constancy of vendor-implemented
correction software; Implement independent
postprocessing assessment and correction
tools and QA procedures
4 3 4 48 434
Inadequate distortion correction 6 6 3 108 663 2 4 3 24 243
3. Overall synCT process
External contour incorrect System-level geometric distortion not taken
into account
5 9 3 135 593 Implement robust QA/QC including
verification tests performed on phantoms;
training of radiation oncology staff with
respect to proper coil use
5 5 3 75 553
Image artifacts preventing accurate external
delineation
3 8 1 24 381 3 6 1 18 361
External anatomy incomplete 3 8 1 24 381 3 6 1 18 361
Anatomy deformed by coils 3 7 2 42 372 3 4 2 24 342
Inaccurate synCT Missing images required for generating synCT 4 2 1 8 421 Standardize sequences 4 1 1 4 411
Organ location inaccurate System-level geometric distortion not taken
into account
6 7 4 168 674 Standardize sequences; optimize sequence
parameters to minimize acquisition time;
implement vendor-independent
postprocessing software
2 2 5 20 225
Patient-induced distortions near interfaces
present
6 7 5 210 675 5 6 5 150 565
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for both workflows, but the FMs were unique for each
method.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of calculated RPN
scores for the FMs unique to either the MR-only or
multimodality workflows. The MR-only workflow yiel-
ded a larger number of FMs (47 compared with 19 for the
conventional) that were generally weighted toward lower
RPN values (mean RPN scores of 75  42). However, the
highest RPN scores between both workflows were ob-
tained for FMs specific to the MR-only workflow, as
shown in Table 1. Table 2 provides the 5 failure pathways
with the highest RPN and SOD scores for the MR-only
workflow. As seen, the FMs with the highest RPNs for
MR-only treatment planning were inaccurate target/organ
delineation arising from inadequate training of MRI
interpretation (RPNZ 240) and patient- and system-level
distortion corrections not being properly managed (RPN
Z 210 and 168, respectively). For the conventional
multimodality workflow, the highest RPN values were
calculated for poor image fusion quality and misinter-
pretation of multimodality information leading to inac-
curate delineation (RPN range, 120-192).
The distribution of SOD values shown in Figure 4 and
Table 1 demonstrates a different pattern in which the bulk
of FMs unique to the MR-only process are of medium
severity (77% of unique SODs falling between 400 and
700). Conversely, FMs unique to the multimodality
workflow were shifted toward higher SOD scores (32%
>700). These higher SODs emphasize the generally more
severe effects of systematic uncertainties in target locali-
zation that arise in this workflow. The highest calculated
SOD values fell under the category of inaccurate target
localization caused by varying bladder and rectal filling
status for both conventional (961, RPN Z 54) and MR-
only (822, RPN Z 32) workflows.
Discussion
In this study, FMEA was performed to systematically
evaluate our proposed MR-only workflow and to compare
it with the existing multimodality standard of care
workflow in our clinic. This comparison indicated that a
significant number of existing processes and procedures
that are in place for the multimodality workflow can be
used without modification for MR-only RTP because so
many of the main processes are identical between the 2
workflows. We also identified key areas of opportunity
for reducing uncertainties in the treatment planning
simulation process in the MR-only workflow.
The most significant FMs introduced by the MR-only
methodology in terms of RPN and SOD focused mainly
on the generation of synCTs and their use in RTP,
meaning that this step provides the highest measure of
risk and that this is in part a result of these FMs having the
most severe consequences within this workflow. These
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FMs generally fell into 2 categories, with the highest
scores arising from (1) inexperience in handling and
interpreting MR data and (2) systematic errors arising
from inadequate postprocessing of the images, such as
residual geometric distortion and intensity nonuniformity
corrections. To mitigate the effects of the first category of
FMs as users gain experience in an MR environment, it is
important for radiation oncology staff to become more
familiarized with MRI sequences used for select disease
sites. This can be accomplished through consultations
with radiologists, the application of consensus guide-
lines,23 or education programs provided at national
meetings such as that of the Radiological Society of North
America.24 Furthermore, standardization of imaging se-
quences and the contrasts presented can be emphasized.
Opportunities to mitigate this risk and improve the
detectability include the addition of contour review
rounds25 or developing checklist items on the physics
chart check to ensure the proper MRI data set was used
for contouring.
To address postprocessing corrections, a robust quality
control/quality assurance program must be implemented
that thoroughly characterizes the magnet to determine the
need for additional gradient nonlinearity distortion and
nonuniformity corrections in addition to vendor-provided
corrections. Automated checks of the DICOM (Digital
Imaging and Communication in Medicine) header can
verify that the 3-dimensional vendor-supplied distortion
correction was applied. We have previously found that
system-level distortions are magnet dependent26; uncor-
rected distortions can be up to 7.4 mm only 23 cm away
Figure 2 Fault tree analysis (FTA) diagram for potential failure modes for inaccurate tumor localization. Abbreviation: MRI Z
magnetic resonance imaging.
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Figure 3 Histogram of risk priority number (RPN) scores for
failure modes unique to either magnetic resonance (MR)eonly
or the multimodality (CT/MR) workflows. Abbreviation: FMEA
Z failure mode and effects analysis.
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from the magnetic isocenter for our 1.0T MR-SIM,
necessitating an additional postprocessing step. Distortion
corrections may be necessary for both the MR/CT and MR-
only treatment planning workflows in large body sites such
as the pelvis, and each body site will have its own unique
challenges and separate workflows. Our daily MR-SIM
QA program verifies constancy and identifies any de-
viations from baseline.
The generation of synCTs was the major source of
unique FMs for MR-only RTP. Table 1 provides the
failure pathways identified and the corresponding RPN
and SOD scores for this process. They can be categorized
into those that arise from errors in the acquired MR data
and those that are caused by the image processing
required to generate the synCT. The first category can be
mitigated through methods similar to those listed earlier:
by development of a standard set of MR sequences along
with training of the MR staff to identify problems in the
MR images, such as apparent intensity nonuniformity, as
they are being acquired. The second can be accomplished
through consistent quality assurance of the synCT gen-
eration. Quality control tests must be incorporated that
can adequately identify gross errors (>5%) because more
subtle errors in Hounsfield Unit (HU) assignment will
have less than 1% impact on dose calculation for photon
planning.27 As can be seen from Table 1, the re-evaluated
FMEA scores after the proposed changes were added to
the prospective workflow could also be split into 2 groups
with increased training and QA/QC procedures leading to
decreases mainly in the occurrence of the errors, and
standardization of procedures and implementation of
postprocessing solutions mainly reducing the severity of
the residual error. The main improvements were seen in
the patient-independent process of correcting for the
geometric distortion and intensity homogeneity by
establishing a correction method independent from the
vendor-supplied software. These measures shifted a high-
risk (RPN Z 168, SOD Z 674) pathway to a low-risk
pathway (RPN Z 20, SOD Z 225).
One limitation of this study is that it includes the
experience of only a single institution. Although efforts
were made to include reviewers with different perspec-
tives and a broad range of experience, knowledge was still
limited mainly to experience with the equipment available
in our department using our own processes and proced-
ures. Although one would expect there to be significant
overlap in the major processes and subprocesses identified
by separate institutions, each institution would most likely
identify several unique FMs and subprocesses that arise
from different workflows and MR system designs. MR
safety and contraindications were shared by both work-
flows, have been evaluated in detail previously, and are
not unique to MR-SIM.28
Experience gained from our analysis may be used to
evaluate our current QA processes to develop more robust
chart checklists in an MR-only workflow. For example,
additional checklist items relating to the QA of generated
synCT images (eg, if bone segmentation were appropriate
and if air pockets were properly characterized) would
serve to add increased scrutiny to this unique aspect of the
MR-only workflow. The FMEA performed here for the
pelvis can also serve as a template for performing further
analyses on different body sites such as the cranium. Most
of the FMEA will be similar to MR-only of the pelvis.
Table 2 Five highest scoring failure modes in terms of RPN and SOD
Failure mode Failure pathway S O D RPN SOD
Wrong data set used for contouring Inadequate training/MR images 6 5 8 240 658
Organ location inaccurate Patient-induced distortions near interfaces present 6 7 5 210 675
Inaccurate dose calculation Bone volume overestimated 6 8 4 192 684
Organ location inaccurate System-level geometric distortion not taken into account 6 7 4 168 674
Treatment volume not properly identified Physician interpretation of images 5 4 8 160 548
Organ location inaccurate Changed target location because of state 8 2 2 32 822
Inaccurate dose calculation Bone volume underestimated 7 5 4 140 754
Organ location inaccurate Patient anatomy is not standard for
patientdunable to reproduce anatomy
7 3 3 63 733
Wrong treatment volume delineated Wrong image set used 7 2 6 84 726
Inaccurate dose calculation Bone volume overestimated 6 8 4 192 684
Abbreviations: RPN Z risk priority number; SOD Z severity-occurrence-detectability.
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Figure 4 Histogram of severity-occurrence-detectability
(SOD) scores for failure modes unique to either magnetic
resonance (MR)eonly or the multimodality computed tomog-
raphy (CT)/MR workflows. Abbreviation: FMEA Z failure
mode and effects analysis.
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Although the coregistration uncertainty tends to be
reduced,29 synCT generation tends to be more complex,30
and system-level distortions are likely to be lower with
the brain positioned near the magnet isocenter.21
Conclusions
Implementation of the FMEA has led to identification
of key areas of focus for risk mitigation in an MR-only
pelvis RTP. Use of the SOD metric allowed us to prior-
itize high-severity FMs. As was expected, obtaining CT
data as part of the conventional multimodality workflow
led to increased detectability of FMs, partially because of
redundant information and preexisting clinical safeguards.
Strategies for mitigating the highest-risk FMs have been
established, and future updates will include incorporation
of image guidance and delivery. Robust design and pro-
cess FMEA is an essential component of continual pro-
cess improvement for safe integration of emerging
technologies into the clinic.
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